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Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, plaintiffs and appellees, First Security Bank ("FSB") and 
First Security Financial ("FSF"), respectfully respond to Eugene 
L. Kimball's Petition for Rehearing with respect to this Court's 
opinion and decision filed on January 2, 1990. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SIX "UNUSUAL PROVISIONS" OF THE PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT, EVEN AS MISCHARACTERIZED AND 
OVERSTATED BY KIMBALL, DO NOT CREATE A DUTY 
OF DISCLOSURE. 
Kimball petitions the Court for rehearing on the 
grounds that the Purchase Agreement between FSB, FSF and the 
Horman Family Trust contains six "unusual provisions." These 
"unusual provisions," argues Kimball, somehow give rise to a duty 
of disclosure. Kimball's argument is unpersuasive for several 
reasons. First, Kimball's characterization of the "unusual 
provisions" at pages 3 and 4 of the Petition for Rehearing is 
unsupported by the record. Second, the provisions cited by 
Kimball are not at all unusual, and their inclusion in the 
Purchase Agreement does not erect some special duty of disclo-
sure. Third, a duty to disclose, as pointed out by the Court in 
its majority opinion, is primarily a function of the relationship 
between the parties. In this case the relationship is between 
junior and senior lienholders. A duty to disclose the purchase 
of a senior lien to a junior lienholder, if it does not already 
exist, is not created as a result of the language employed in the 
purchase agreement between a senior lienholder and a third-party 
purchaser. 
A. Kimball's Characterization of the Purchase Agree-
ment is Unsupported by the Record. 
The inclusion of what Kimball terms some "unusual 
provisions" in the Purchase Agreement is insufficient to warrant 
a rehearing in this matter. Each of the "unusual provisions" 
identified by Kimball is addressed below. 
1. Confidentiality Provision. Admittedly, the 
October 1984 Settlement Agreements, including the Purchase 
Agreement, were subject to a confidentiality provision. Such 
provisions are neither unusual nor uncommon. Indeed, confidenti-
ality provisions and agreements are standard in many complex 
commercial transactions between private parties. Similarly, a 
common element of most transactions is the allocation of the 
various risks associated with the deal. There is nothing unlaw-
ful, subversive or improper about such measures; they simply 
recognize that most transactions have some inherent risks and 
legitimate reasons for confidentiality. 
Contrary to Kimball's assertion at page 3 of the 
Petition for Rehearing, the banks' lawyers, Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, not only knew the basis for the Purchase Agreement, but 
they participated in its drafting and advised the banks as to the 
agreement's legality. (See citations to the Record at pp. 10-14 
-2-
of FSB's Brief on appeal). The lawyers retained by Commonwealth 
Land Title Company to defend the banks' priority positions under 
the title policy were informed that a multi-faceted settlement 
had occurred. (id.) In addition, dismissal papers were filed 
with the court and served on all parties of record. (Id. ) 
The mere fact the parties decided to preserve the 
confidentiality of an agreement does not give rise to a duty to 
disclose the very thing intended to be kept confidential. 
2. Normal Business Transaction. Kimball appar-
ently takes the position that since the Purchase Agreement was 
consummated during litigation, it was not a "normal business 
transaction." (Petition for Rehearing at p. 3.) Litigation, or 
the threat thereof, is often the catalyst for a particular 
business transaction, a restructuring, settlement, purchase or 
other resolution of the problem. There is nothing in the Court's 
detailed analysis to suggest that merely because parties may be 
in some phase of litigation or have unresolved disputes between 
them, that a duty is thereby created to disclose to the public 
the details of the resolution of those differences. 
Kimball's statement at page 3 of the Petition for 
Rehearing that "the defendants did not even make the existence of 
an agreement known to the court" is false and unsupported by the 
record. Immediately upon execution of the October 1984 Settle-
ment Agreements, including the Purchase Agreement, the banks 
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caused a notice to be filed with the court and served on the 
parties. (See citations to the Record at pp. 11-18 of FSB's 
Brief on appeal). Discovery requests were then immediately filed 
by other parties to the action seeking disclosure of the agree-
ments. The banks offered to have the court examine the Purchase 
Agreement and the other documents jji camera in accordance with 
the discovery process. When finally ordered to produce the 
documents, the banks immediately did so. {Id.) Such a sequence 
is not at all "unusual," but is rather commonplace when parties 
are trying to preserve the confidentiality of certain documents. 
3. False Statements of Consideration - Kimball 
apparently maintains that a party's choice of consideration may 
give rise to a duty to disclose. Neither FSB nor FSF admitted 
the certificate of deposit was "a false step without business 
purpose . . ."as alleged by Kimball. (Petition for Rehearing 
at p.3). The record simply reflects that the banks did not have 
a preference between cash or an irrevocable assignment of a 
certificate of deposit. The certificate of deposit simply 
provided a convenient mechanism whereby interest could be paid 
back to the Horman Family Trust during the first year of the 
certificate or until resolution of the litigation, whichever 
occurred first. Interestingly, if the parties intended the use 
of the certificate of deposit to prevent the transaction from 
being considered a "payment" as admitted by Kimball, (Petition 
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for Rehearing at p. 3), that serves only to substantiate the 
position taken by the bank and Horman that the liens were pur-
chased not paid. 
A duty to disclose cannot be deemed to exist based 
simply on whether the parties utilized cash, checks, certificates 
of deposit or some other medium as a consideration for a deal, 
4. Disguised Transaction - Kimball cites no 
authority to support his assertion that the parties attempted to 
disguise the transaction as something it was not. The Purchase 
Agreement clearly and unambiguously describes the nature of the 
deal. The Court summarized the essence of the transaction at 
page 3 of its Opinion. The Purchase Agreement merely took into 
account the possible outcomes of the then pending foreclosure 
proceeding. Because the outcome of the foreclosure action was 
still undetermined, the Purchase Agreement of necessity had to be 
a contingent agreement. 
5. Recordation of Instruments - Until the Court 
determined priority or the Horman Family Trust exercised an 
option under the Purchase Agreement, no recordable event had 
occurred. 
6. Allocation of Risks - Allocation of risk is a 
perfectly reasonable and prudent component of business transac-
tions. As with the other "unusual provisions" identified by 
Kimball, allocation of risk between the Horman Family Trust and 
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the banks did not impair or alter the relationship or duties owed 
to Kimball as the junior lienholder. Allocation of risk of loss 
for whatever reason between a senior lienholder and a third-party 
purchaser is not a factor which would typically create a duty of 
disclosure owed to a junior lienholder. 
The jury obviously was not convinced by Kimball's 
arguments at trial that these "unusual provisions" were evidence 
that FSB And FSF had engaged in "wrongful conduct," (Petition 
for Rehearing at p. 4). The jury verdict vindicating FSB and FSF 
of any wrongful conduct so manifests. In view of the jury 
verdict in favor of the banks, this Court must view the facts in 
the light most favorable to FSB and FSF, a consideration Kimball 
has obviously ignored in characterizing the provisions discussed 
above as "badges of fraud." 
Consideration of the factual "omissions" raised by 
Kimball is more properly deferred to the question of breach, an 
inquiry that occurs only after a duty is found to exist. Even 
then, the factual "omissions" would have to be viewed with due 
difference being given to the jury verdict in favor of FSB and 
FSF, something Kimball has not done in his Petition for 
Rehearing. 
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B. The Legal Analysis Employed by the Court Applies 
To This Case, 
Kimball does not attack the legal analysis of this 
Courtf only its application of that analysis to the facts, 
Kimball attempts to illustrate this point with two examples. The 
first example is a typical situation involving purchase of a 
first mortgage by a third party. Kimball agrees that no duty to 
disclose the purchase to the junior lienholder exists in this 
scenario. 
The second example cited by Kimball is a badly flawed 
attempt to depict the situation in this case. The example 
erroneously states that the third party — T, or in this case the 
Horman Family Trust, agreed to purchase the first lienholder1s 
rights or pay the debtor's obligation. The Purchase Agreement 
contemplated only an option to purchase of the banks1 bundle of 
rights in the mortgage. The Purchase Agreement contains no 
provision for payment of the liens. Additionally, the record 
does not support Kimball's assertion that the Purchase Agreement 
contains requirements that the "purchase be kept secret until 
such time as [Kimball] loses any rights he may have to claim an 
interest in the property." (Petition for Rehearing at p. 6). 
Indeed, the Purchase Agreement contemplated and allowed for the 
possibility that Kimball would be successful on his equitable 
arguments regarding priority and be elevated to a first position. 
-7-
This was the contingent nature of the agreement. It contemplated 
and provided for the possibility that Kimball would be in first 
position. 
Kimball's first example, the normal third-party pur-
chase of a senior lienr with a slight modification to take into 
account the fact that the purchase took place during the course 
of litigation, reflects what actually occurred in this case. 
This distinction simply required that the Purchase Agreement 
contain some contingencies to account for the possible outcomes 
of the foreclosure proceeding. As pointed out by the Court in 
its majority opinion, the Purchase Agreement basically provided 
that the third-party purchaser, the Horman Family Trust, had the 
option of purchasing the senior lienholders' rights. 
Kimball fails to articulate any reasons why a greater 
duty of disclosure should attach when the purchase occurs during 
litigation or is contingent in nature. A purchase of the rights 
of a mortgagor leaves intact the lien priorities, rights and 
remedies as between junior and senior lienholders. 
Adoption of Kimball's argument would mean that a duty 
to disclose is created whenever a senior lien is purchased and a 
junior lienholder screams "payment." Such a result would place 
an unbearable burden of the mortgage industry and give rise to 
pointless litigation. 
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II. BANBERRY HAD STANDING TO APPEAL THE "PAYMENT" 
FINDING. 
Kimball's second main point in his Petition for Rehear-
ing is that the "payment" versus "purchase" issue was not prop-
erly before this Court on appeal. Kimball is correct in assert-
ing that neither the banks not Kimball appealed the payment 
finding. It is also true the Horman Family Trust was never a 
party to this action, the same never having been joined by 
Kimball. However, as the Court correctly pointed out in its 
opinion, not only was the jury instruction on payment flawed, but 
the special verdict form erroneously asked whether Banberry had 
paid the banks' liens. (Opinion at p. 21.) Banberry was not a 
party to the Purchase Agreement. Thus, there is specific jury 
finding which Banberry apparently believed was erroneous. 
The unappealed finding that Horman was not the alter 
ego of the Horman Family Trust is critical in this regard since 
the Trust, and not Banberry, was the purchaser under the Purchase 
Agreement. Banberry cannot be stripped of its standing to 
challenge an erroneous jury instruction and verdict form simply 
because Kimball views the erroneous finding as favorable to 
Banberry. 
1
 However, the issue of "payment" v. "purchase" was indirectly 
raised on appeal by Kimball as an integral part of its 
cross-appeal on the conspiracy issue. Thus, Kimball put the pay-
ment finding in issue. 
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Banberry specifically preserved the issue of "purchase" 
versus "payment" on appeal and the issue was properly before the 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Kimball has failed to articulate any persuasive reasons 
as to why the Court should grant a rehearing in this matter. For 
the reasons articulated herein, FSB and FSF respectfully request 
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